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Drawing on Bourdieu’s concept of the field of power, we examine the cross-national 
translation of organizational models and the strategic processes induced in recipient 
institutional contexts. By means of an in-depth historical case study, we demonstrate how 
elite strategists mobilized networks and symbolic capital to disrupt field relations and embed 
the US community foundation model of philanthropy in North East England. Our findings 
suggest that instead of simply copying alien field-level practices, strategic actors within the 
philanthropic field adapted and modified them to deliver fit-for-context change legitimated by 
support from the regional power elite. Our main contribution is to show how strategic elites 
drawn from different life-worlds build coalitions within the field of power to modify 
institutional infrastructures and embed innovative organizational models, simultaneously 
bolstering their legitimacy and symbolic capital. We hold that the field of power construct 
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1. Introduction 
How might the theoretical constructs of Pierre Bourdieu be deployed to enrich 
strategy research? In this article, we propose that Bourdieu’s understanding that strategies 
and strategizing cannot be disentangled from the everyday struggles that take place between 
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more or less powerful actors within hierarchically stratified fields of human endeavour 
provides a valuable counterpoint to mainstream strategy theory (Bourdieu, 1990b; Bourdieu 
& Wacquant, 1992). Whereas mainstream theory is founded on the idea that any organization 
with the right strategy might liberate itself from present constraints and limitations (Barney, 
1991; Porter, 1996), in the Bourdieusian world, the availability of strategic options is a 
function of power, defined practically as command over resources (Maclean, Harvey, & 
Chia, 2010, p. 328). Entirely blue skies strategizing is not possible when enmeshed in power-
laden networks of dependencies within fields. On the one hand, dominant actors pursue 
strategies of domination, bringing to bear the full weight of superior resources to stay ahead 
of challengers (De Clercq & Voronov, 2009; Wright, 2009). Their strategies are heavily 
conditioned by the power and resources they already possess, consolidating existing positions 
and seeking avenues for future growth, often by acquiring would-be rivals before they 
become strong. On the other hand, subordinate actors, lesser players within fields, in lacking 
the full complement of critical resources, pursue subversive strategies to undermine the 
positions of dominant actors and actively create new positions within markets and fields 
(Emirbayer & Williams, 2005). In doing so, they take advantage of newly emerging 
possibilities stemming from developments in tastes, incomes and technologies, moving 
quickly before more dominant players can nullify their strategic moves (Bourdieu, 1993a). In 
what follows, we elaborate these ideas theoretically and demonstrate their value empirically 
through a case study of strategic translation within the philanthropic field. 
We take our lead from Carter and Whittle (2018, p.1) who make a strong case for 
liberating strategy research and discourse from the economistic mainstream, with its roots in 
industrial economics, to ‘articulate ways of evaluating how it is done, and how it could be 
done differently, from the perspective of society as a whole not just the corporate elite.’ What 
is missing from mainstream strategy, they hold, is serious consideration of the social realm, 
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inside and outside organizations; of the crucible in which real world strategies are forged and 
enacted (Mueller & Carter, 2007). Hence the disregard in mainstream research for issues 
relating to ‘social norms, rules, values, roles, identities, beliefs, discourses, symbols, 
meaning-systems, systems of domination, power relations and ideologies’ (Carter & Whittle, 
2018, pp. 1-2). 
This lacuna is addressed in this paper through consideration of the potential value to 
strategy research of Bourdieu’s core constructs, especially that of the field of power. 
Bourdieu is eminently qualified to represent both dominant and dominated classes, having 
experienced the ‘life world’ of both as a ‘sociologist whose origins are in what is called the 
people and who has reached what is called the elite’ (Bourdieu, 1990a, p. 178). Coming from 
provincial, lower-middle-class social origins, he rose to the pinnacle of the academic pyramid 
(Maclean, Harvey, & Press, 2006). Born in 1930 in Béarn in southwestern France, Bourdieu 
secured a place at the elite Ecole Normale Supérieure (ENS) in Paris, which annually admits 
a small number of talented recruits. Lacking the social and cultural capital of his classmates, 
without the ‘unselfconscious belonging of those born to wealth, cultural pedigree and elite 
accents’, he considered himself a frustrated ‘oblate’ (Swartz, 1997, p. 18). The experience of 
alienation induced in him a thirst for revenge against the institutions responsible for his 
success, incensed by the contrast between their ostensible ideals and imputed prejudice 
against the lower classes (Bourdieu, 1996). He lambasted their role as institutions of social 
reproduction (Bourdieu, 1970, 1979).  
Bourdieu’s ideas on social domination began to take shape during his period of 
military service in Algeria beginning in 1955. Discerning parallels between Kabylian society 
and the peasant community of Béarn, he began social scientific research as a self-taught 
ethnographer (Bourdieu, 1962, 1979). His status as a provincial outsider excluded from the 
social elite was confirmed by experience on returning to Paris, imbuing his writing with an 
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anti-institutional critique (Calhoun & Wacquant, 2002). Even after election to the Chair of 
Sociology at the Collège de France in 1981, he remained excluded from the very highest 
echelons of the French academic elite. Lacking a doctorat d’Etat, the primary qualification 
for a university chair, meant his career lacked a key element of state-conferred legitimacy and 
distinction; he was not entitled, for example, to preside over the viva voce examination of a 
doctoral thesis. The absence of an exemplary manifestation of symbolic capital doubtless 
pained Bourdieu, for whom the state represents the main perpetrator of symbolic violence in 
society, partly due to its power to name, to bestow on individuals ‘its social titles of 
recognition’ (Bourdieu, 1999, p. 337). In sum, Bourdieu’s lived experience was critical to his 
understanding of the social processes that inform and regulate society (Bourdieu & 
Wacquant, 1992). 
Within the literatures of accounting as well as organization studies, Bourdieu’s master 
concepts of capital (economic, cultural, social and symbolic resources), field (social spaces of 
objective relations between positions) and habitus (internalized dispositions) have been 
deployed in numerous studies to help make visible social processes whose successful 
operation depends on remaining invisible to those involved (Malsch, Gendron, & Grazzini, 
2011; Maclean & Harvey, 2019). Yet, to date, his ideas have impacted only marginally on 
strategy as a field of research, despite the evident potential to enrich theory by taking power 
seriously as a variable impacting strategic practices and outcomes (Hardy & Thomas, 2014). 
We address this issue in what follows both theoretically and empirically. Our theoretical 
contribution is to elaborate the importance to strategy practice of Bourdieu’s concept of the 
field of power, defined here as the social space in which elite actors at the pinnacle of diverse 
fields form coalitions to promote significant changes in laws, rules, regulations, practices, and 
societal resources flows (Maclean, Harvey, & Kling, 2014). Our empirical contribution is to 
demonstrate the value of Bourdieu’s theoretical schema to strategy through a case study of 
5 
 
strategic translation: the embedding of the community foundation model of philanthropy in 
North East England. 
In what follows, we first present our ideas on the potential value of Bourdieusian 
theory to enrich strategy research, considering achievements to date and future potentialities. 
Our primary purpose is to identify hitherto underexploited opportunities, particularly with 
respect to the field of power as a unifying theoretical construct. In the next section, we lay the 
groundwork for our case study of the Community Foundation for Tyne & Wear and 
Northumberland (CFTWN), now the largest philanthropic foundation of its type in the UK 
and one of the largest in Europe. Next, we detail our methodology, that of historical 
organization studies. Our case analysis is then presented in the form of a theoretically 
informed narrative of strategic translation. We consider the implications in our discussion and 
conclusion. 
2. Power and strategy 
Bourdieu’s ideas have not been pursued extensively by strategy researchers, who, by and 
large, remain wedded to positivism and to economic rather than sociological perspectives 
(Carter & Whittle, 2018). There are notable exceptions. Indeed, Bourdieu’s book The logic of 
practice (1990b) is claimed as one of the foundational texts of the strategy-as-practice school 
(Jarzabkowski, 2004; Whittington, 2006), which argues that strategizing ‘relies on 
organizational and other practices that significantly affect both the process and the outcome 
of resulting strategies … [offering] an alternative to the individualistic models of decision-
making that still dominate the field of strategic management’ (Vaara & Whittington, 2012, p. 
285). His articulation of the role played by social capital in mobilizing strategic networks has 
also been influential (Acquaah, 2007; Moran, 2005), and so too several other key concepts 
such as habitus (Tsoukas, 1996). What is striking, however, is the selectiveness with which 
Bourdieu’s concepts are often applied, abstracted from his broader theoretical project, 
6 
 
without reference to the underlying politics and power relations at work in making and 
implementing strategies (Hurtado, 2010). Thus, we begin here by exploring the conceptual 
unity of his theoretical schema and how this might inform strategy research. 
2.1 Power and the transmutability of capitals 
For Bourdieu, all symbolic systems – whether cultural or linguistic – are sources of 
domination, helping to fix and preserve social hierarchies. Like many social theorists, 
Bourdieu views power as fundamental to understanding how change occurs in society and 
organizations (Bourdieu, 1996; Friedland, 2009). This is a crucial point because strategy is 
fundamentally about the accrual and exercise of power (Freedman, 2018). Power, in 
Bourdieu’s view, is multifaceted and distributed, embedded in structures and relationships, 
and exercised in innumerable ways, sometimes visible, often unseen and irrecoverable 
(Bourdieu, 1996, 1999). According to this view, power emanates not only from above but 
also from below, dependent on those who bear its effects, on rulers and ruled in equal 
measure (Bourdieu, 1996, 1999, 2014). The ultimate source of power in society derives from 
the possession of economic, cultural, social, and symbolic capital (Bourdieu, 1986). The 
power stemming from command of such resources is ever varying in quantum, because 
capital formation is an on-going, dynamic process, subject to both accumulation and attrition 
(Bourdieu, 1985).  
An agent’s positioning in social space is contingent upon ‘overall volume and relative 
composition of capital’ (Anheier, Gerhards, & Romo, 1995, p. 892). We typically think of 
capital in its economic forms – for example, as industrial plant, real estate or financial assets 
– but equally it may be cultural, in the form of education, valued knowledge or expertise, or 
symbolic, as, for example, in the authority to define and legitimize cultural values. Capital 
may also be social, defined by access and positioning within important social networks 
(Stringfellow, McMeeking, & Maclean, 2015). Each form of capital is transmutable to a 
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degree, since economic capital is liquid and might via intermediation purchase cultural, 
social, and even symbolic capital, while possession of any of these affords opportunities to 
make money (Bourdieu, 1986). Legitimacy, the acceptance of domination by the 
subordinated, is signified by possession of symbolic capital, including titles, qualifications 
and belongings, itself bound up with the other three forms of capital, possession of each 
incorporating the symbolic capital that goes with it. Capital is field-specific, which means 
that different forms of capital dominate and legitimate different fields. According to Bourdieu 
(1985, p. 724), ‘(c)apital … represents a power over the field … The kinds of capital, like the 
aces in a game of cards, are powers that define the chances of profit in a given field.’ The 
implications are that success in strategy implementation depends on having the right 
quantities of each type of capital and that strategic management involves mastery of the 
processes of capital conversion and accumulation. 
2.2 Fields as arenas of competition 
Fields, for Bourdieu, are networks of social relations, structured systems of social 
positions within which struggles take place over resources, stakes, and access. They overlap 
and are often in flux. According to Bourdieu (1993a, p. 135), ‘what defines the structure of 
the field … is also the principle of its dynamics.’ Bourdieu (1984, p. 94) argues that 
‘dispositions constituting the cultivated habitus are only formed, only function and are only 
valid in a field, in the relationship with a field.’ Positions within individual fields are 
‘positions of possibility’ (Oakes, Townley, & Cooper, 1998, p. 288), because they are not 
stable but reflect relations of power. In our empirical study, for example, community 
foundations constitute a sub-field operating within the broad philanthropic field in which the 
main actors are philanthropic foundations, non-profit organizations, public bodies, and the 
frontline charities that deliver services to clients. Individual fields and sub-fields are nested in 
a hierarchically structured set of fields, including the economically dominant field of 
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entrepreneurship, the ultimate source of cash for charitable organizations (Harvey, Maclean, 
& Suddaby, 2019). 
For Bourdieu, forms of capital and the structure of a field are interdependent 
(Bourdieu, 1985; Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992). Capital endowments determine the strategies 
and tactics available to actors, and the ability of actors to define field boundaries and degree 
of autonomy enjoyed inside the field (Bourdieu, 1984). Possession of capital is also 
fundamental to change. Within the philanthropic field, for example, the negotiating power of 
foundations, charities, public bodies and firms is a function of the capital at their disposal 
(Harvey et al., 2019). Relations between actors are always in flux because capital 
endowments vary in relative worth depending on market and quasi-market valuations. When 
entrepreneurs, firms, and foundations dominate, it is because economic capital is most highly 
valued; whereas when charities and public bodies dominate, it is because social and symbolic 
capital are most highly prized, typically in conferring legitimacy or in bringing vital 
knowledge to an established project or new charitable initiative. There are two main 
implications for strategy. First, actors within fields have widely differing degrees of strategic 
freedom; dominant actors, with abundant resources, being far more agentic than subordinate 
actors possessing fewer resources. Secondly, dominant actors become vulnerable to 
competitive threats when the value of their cultural and symbolic capitals are marked down 
due to exogenous changes in taste, technologies and incomes impacting on demand (Harvey, 
Press, & Maclean, 2011). 
2.3 Symbolic power and world-making 
The socially embedded nature of power frequently causes it to be ‘misrecognized’ by 
those it holds in its sway (Bourdieu, 1990b, pp. 112–123). This applies especially to symbolic 
power, ‘that invisible power which can be exercised only with the complicity of those who do 
not want to know that they are subject to it or even that they themselves exercise it’ 
9 
 
(Bourdieu, 1991, p. 164). Objective relations of power reproduce themselves in relations of 
symbolic power (Harrits, 2011). In the struggle to impose common sense meanings, agents 
put into action symbolic capital acquired in previous struggles. Thus, the historic titles of 
nobility, won by ancestors in bloody conflicts centuries ago, still confer on titleholders the 
right to share in the profits of recognition (Bourdieu, 1999, 2014). In fact, there are always, in 
any society, conflicts between symbolic powers that aim at imposing a vision of legitimate 
divisions between people. Symbolic power, in this sense, is ‘a power of “world-making”’, 
which, according to Bourdieu (1989, p. 22), consists ‘in separating and reuniting, often in the 
same operation … by the use of labels.’ To change the world, therefore, actors must change 
the ways of world-making (Bourdieu, 1987). They must change both the prevailing vision of 
how society is ordered and the means of classifying and reproducing groups in society. 
Symbolic power is ‘a power of consecration or revelation, the power to consecrate or to 
reveal things that are already there’ (Bourdieu, 1989, p. 23).  
Bourdieu introduces the notion of ‘symbolic violence’ to understand social 
reproduction through cultural mechanisms: ‘symbolic violence, to put it as tersely and simply 
as possible, is the violence which is exercised upon a social agent with his or her complicity’ 
(Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 167). Bourdieu (1977) uses the term symbolic violence to 
indicate that mechanisms of social control are not always explicit and do not necessarily 
involve conscious and direct strategic action. It is not therefore necessary for power to be 
visible or even felt in order to be effective. Thus, Bourdieu (1977, p. 196) refers to symbolic 
violence as the ‘gentle, hidden form which violence takes when overt violence is impossible.’ 
This should not be seen as overly deterministic (Calhoun, 1995; Spence & Carter, 2014), as 
Bourdieu (1985, p. 728) states, ‘objects of the social world can be perceived and uttered in 
different ways they always include a degree of indeterminacy and fuzziness.’ Individuals or 
groups may collectively strategize to obtain or create important positions, but, for Bourdieu, 
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strategies are not entirely rational calculative decisions. The existence, form, and direction of 
change depends both on the state of the system, the ‘repertoire of possibilities which it 
offers’, and ‘the balance of forces between social agents who have entirely real interests in 
the different possibilities available to them’ (Bourdieu, 1993b, p. 34). The ability of agents to 
‘un-make’ and ‘re-make’ the social world depends on ‘realistic knowledge of what it is and 
what they can do with it from the position they occupy within it’ (Bourdieu, 1985, p. 734). 
What Bourdieu offers strategists, as his thinking on symbolic power makes plain, is 
an entirely different conception of strategy context from that offered by the mainstream 
theories of strategy focused on competitive positioning (Porter, 1996) and the resource-based 
view (Barney, 1991). Mainstream theory conceives of power purely in terms of market 
power, both in terms of strategic intent, the pursuit of sustainable competitive advantage, and 
rewards, the most powerful firms earning super-normal profits that might be reinvested to 
perpetuate domination. In contrast, Bourdieu’s conceives of a more complex and realistic 
strategy context in which power stems from multiple sources, actors are interdependent, 
history and habitus matter, and goals may be collective as well as self-interested. 
2.4 Habitus and the logic of practice 
A particular strength of Bourdieusian theory is its focus on formative practices within 
organizations and the logic underpinning such practices, conceived as customary, habitual or 
naturalized ways of doing things (Bourdieu, 1990b).  Hence Bourdieu’s appeal to the 
strategy-as-practice school (Burgelman, Floyd, Laamanen, Mantere, Vaara, & Whittington, 
2018; Jarzabkowski, 2004; Whittington, 2006). The most comprehensive review of 
strategizing from this standpoint is provided by Gomez (2015) in the second edition of The 
Cambridge Handbook of Strategy as Practice. In this, Gomez highlights the 
interconnectedness of Bourdieu’s thinking on habitus, field, forms of capital and social 
practices, and how actors draw on these when playing the strategy game. The everyday 
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practices on which the strategy-as-practice school focus depend crucially on organizational 
and field norms. In turn, the differing positions of actors within fields depend on the 
quantities and composition of capitals they possess (Gomez & Bouty, 2011).  
The appeal of habitus as a theoretical concept, according to Chia and MacKay (2007, 
p. 226), lies in its role as ‘the real author of everyday coping action.’ Habitus, as a system of 
lasting, transposable and socially constituted dispositions (Bourdieu, 1990b), lends actors ‘a 
feel for the game’ (Bourdieu, 1998, p. 25). Habitus ‘resides in codes of behaviour that 
strategists learn and internalize (encompassing their beliefs and rituals); it is something tacit 
and unspoken but yet well understood and followed.’ (Rasche & Chia, 2009, p. 718). Habitus 
is important because it shapes the praxis of strategizing. In generating similar dispositions 
within groups, habitus induces commitment to a common praxis based on categories of 
‘perception and appreciation’ (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 170). This affords strategists a secure feel 
for the game, an intuitive understanding of available options and how these might play out. 
Habitus causes strategists to favour options their dispositions suggest will lead to success. 
Spence and Carter (2014), for example, show how the habitus of partners and other senior 
accountants shapes praxis at ‘Big 4’ accounting firms, leading to professional hierarchies in 
which the commercial logic of practice holds sway over its technical counterpart. 
How habitus, field and capital interact and impact on the formation, embedding and 
normalization of strategic practices is demonstrated in Oakes, Townley and Cooper’s (1998) 
study of the introduction of business planning at provincial museums in Alberta, Canada. The 
authors explains how language and power may be used to facilitate control by means of 
symbolic violence, enabling establishment of a new normal in discourse and practices 
relating to markets, consumers, and products. This was made possible by fundamentally 
changing ‘the allocation of capital to positions within the field  … attrition of the field's 
traditional cultural capital [leaving] the division and its members increasingly vulnerable to 
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further external challenges in the name of economic capital’ (Oakes et al.,, 1998, p. 284). 
What this demonstrates is that strategy should be understood as a collective, socially and 
politically embedded phenomenon (Carter & Mueller, 2006; Mueller & Carter, 2007), not as 
the individualistic pursuit of the visionary leaders beloved in the strategic management 
literature (Vaara & Whittington, 2012). It confirms, moreover, that power is ultimately the 
‘motor of field dynamics in Bourdieu’s theory’ (Friedland, 2009. p. 888).  
2.5 The field of power 
 At the apex of Bourdieu’s conceptual schema is the relatively neglected construct of 
the field of power, which, we believe, has the potential to open up fresh avenues of strategy 
research (Bourdieu, 1993b, 1996; Swartz, 1997, 2008). The construct is essentially the 
capstone of his theory of fields in which society is conceived as divided into a series of 
domains and sub-domains, each defined by prevailing field-specific rules of competition, 
practices and actor dispositions (Swartz, 1997). The most dominant actors within each field 
constitute the field elite (Bourdieu, 1986, 1990b), such as corporate leaders within the field of 
business and government ministers within the field of politics. The field of power thus 
embraces members from a multiplicity of fields, at the head of their respective fields, but 
with fields like business more heavily represented than others (Wacquant, 1993). It might be 
thought of as an affiliation of dominant agents transcending individual fields. The construct 
of the field of power effectively shifts the emphasis away from the hierarchical distribution of 
power to the inter-organizational, where dominant agents compete and collaborate variously 
with peers across different life-worlds (Maclean et al., 2014). 
The field of power functions as an ‘arena of struggle’ (Swartz, 2008, p. 50) concerned 
with change or resistance to change  It both sets elite agents against one another, whilst 
providing the necessary structural conditions for them to collaborate through the formation of 
time-limited, issue-based coalitions (O’Mahony & Bechky, 2008). Through networks forged 
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within the field of power, elite agents seek to influence societal decision-making processes, 
resource flows, opinion formation and wider logics of action by strengthening commitment to 
particular projects or objectives or to the status quo. As purveyors of legitimizing narratives, 
they inform collective systems of meaning (Creed, Scully, & Austin, 2002). Fligstein (1997) 
explains how they exploit their social skills to direct authority and frame action. It is essential 
that their actions are legitimized by wider public perceptions of civic-mindedness and 
disinterestedness (Bourdieu, 1996), since, as Fligstein (1997, p. 400) argues, ‘if others think 
that one wants something and that it is narrowly for selfish purposes, then they are unlikely to 
try to negotiate’. 
The implications for strategy research are profound because, on this account, strategy 
is Janus-faced. On the one hand, it is about on-going struggles for status and resources within 
fields. On the other hand, it is about how the most powerful actors in society band together in 
time-limited coalitions to engage in world-making ideological, regulatory, fiscal and 
institutional struggles. This latter brand of strategy has obvious affinities with non-market 
strategy, but even here the potentialities of the field of power construct have gone unnoticed 
(Doh, Lawton, & Rajwani, 2012; Lawton, McGuire, & Rajwani, 2013). 
2.6 Summation 
The essential difference between Bourdieu’s understanding of strategy and that of the 
mainstream economistic writers who have dominated the field for three decades (Barney, 
1991; Porter, 1996) is captured most memorably in his assertion that ‘practice has a logic 
which is not that of the logician’ (Bourdieu, 1990b, p. 86). According to Bourdieu (1990b, p. 
92), all social practices, strategizing included, are rooted in historically evolving contexts and 
subject to ‘a “logic in itself”, without conscious reflexion or logical control’. Yet, 
notwithstanding the implications of his philosophical stance, researchers within the strategy 
mainstream have conscripted individual concepts in the service of orthodoxy. It is tempting, 
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for example, to construct and test hypotheses like ‘the social capital developed from the 
networking relationships and ties with top managers at other firms will be positively related 
to organizational performance’ (Acquaah, 2007, p. 1240). With notable exceptions, as 
pointed out by Gomez (2015), few scholars have fully embraced Bourdieusian theory as a 
radically different way of viewing and analysing strategies and strategists. 
3. Research context and case study 
Our aim in what follows is to apply Bourdieu’s master concepts, especially that of the 
field of power, in studying the strategic practice of translating an organizational model. Our 
empirical focus is the philanthropic field in North East England, and the strategy that 
underpinned the launch and embedding of the CFTWN. We argue that for translation to be 
successful, adopted practices must be homologous with – or at least not obstructing – existing 
structures and practices within the field. Alignment, when introducing an alien organizational 
form into a traditional setting, requires significant institutional adjustment, negotiated by 
hyper-agents within the field of power. Pronounced power differentials are to be found in the 
philanthropic field as in other fields, wherein the most dominant actors, the so-called 
dominant dominants in possession of the largest agglomerations of capital, are routinely able 
to inflict symbolic violence on lesser actors (Swartz, 2013). We next locate our case study 
organization within the contemporary history of the region it serves. 
3.1 Strategic context 
The North East of England is one of the most peripheral economic regions in the UK. 
Peripheral regions lack adaptive capacity and often require state-led policies to stimulate 
innovation, entrepreneurship and growth (Pike, Dawley, & Tomaney, 2010). Following the 
collapse of its staple industries – shipbuilding, heavy engineering, iron and steel, coal mining 
– in the 1970s and 1980s, the North East lost the economic vitality for which it had once been 
famed. Most of what remained of the traditional industries that had previously employed 
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hundreds of thousands of people, disappeared after the colliery closures following the miners’ 
strike of 1984-85. Deindustrialization, which impacted negatively across Britain, hit the 
North East particularly hard, shaping the region’s culture in the late twentieth and early 
twenty-first century (Tomaney & Ward, 2000). The North East continues to suffer from the 
socio-economic and political malaise identified with deindustrialization (Pike, 1999), and 
associated inequalities in household incomes, education and health (Hudson, 2005). 
As industrial decline bit hard after the late 1960s, regional policy emphasized the need 
for industrial modernization (Morgan, 1985). The attraction of inward investment in sectors 
such as electronics became a key part of this drive (Cooke, 1982; Dawley, 2007). In the 
North East, periodic coalitions comprising business leaders, trade unionists and public-sector 
bodies formed to attract inward investment and promote economic modernization (Carney & 
Hudson, 1978; Morgan, 1985; Shaw, 1993). In Bourdieusian terms, elite actors active in the 
field of power, whose collective interests were under threat, joined forces to lobby 
government for support and to promote economic regeneration (Lanigan, 1997). They 
participated in central government initiatives like the North East Economic Planning Council 
(1965-79), the Northern Development Company (established 1986), and the North East 
Regional Development Agency, One North East (1999-2012). A notable success came in 
1984 when Nissan Motors of Japan decided to locate its first European plant in Sunderland, 
having garnered a total of £112 million in subsidies from the British government and the 
acquisition of a 930-acre factory site at agricultural land prices (Kenner & Rehder, 1995).  
3.2 Case study 
The CFTWN launched in October 1988 as the Foundation for Tyne & Wear with the 
support of two local philanthropists, historical novelist Catherine Cookson and affordable 
house builder Sir William Leechi, and substantial funding from the Baring Foundation and 
four North East charitable trusts (CFTWN, 2018). It was conceived by its founders, elites 
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active within the regional field of power, as part of a wider campaign for socioeconomic 
renewal within the North East. They took the view that ‘funds should mainly come from 
those who had a great deal of it – the wealthy, businesses, and other charitable trusts – not 
from those who have relatively little’ (CFTWN, 2010, p. 23), rejecting mass solicitation of 
funds as its modus operandi. Following early successes, the foundation extended its 
geographic scope in 1992 to include Northumberland, changing its name to the CFTWN. 
Community foundations constitute a distinctive organizational sub-field nested within 
the much broader philanthropic field, as shown in Figure 1. In the UK, sub-field formation 
substantially took place in just two decades between 1985 and 2006 when 41 of the present 
46 members of its representative body, UK Community Foundations, were established. In 
2019, the movement as a whole had total assets of near £800 million, including endowed 
funds of almost £700 million, and in 2018-19 made grants to frontline service providing 
charities and community groups of approximately £100 million. Like other community 
foundations, the CFTWN raises money from individuals, companies, and other trusts and 
foundations, the majority held in donor-advised funds. Charities apply for grants, which, 
following completion of a due diligence process, are awarded at the ultimate discretion of 
fund holders under advice from community foundation staff. Grants stem either from in-year 
donations or from the interest received on endowments. Fund management companies 
appointed by the CFTWN trustees manage endowed funds as a pool. The foundation strives 
to enable effective giving by individuals, families, and businesses; to support non-profit 
organizations with money, time, and skills; and to influence and inform about issues affecting 
communities in its catchment area (CFTWN, 2011). It has grown to become the largest and 
most successful community foundation in the UK and, indeed, outside North America 
(CFTWN, 2010; CFTWN, 2018). The CFTWN’s endowed funds grew from £20,000 in 1990 
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to £81.2 million in 2019, and in 2018-19 it made 1,515 grants with a total value of £7.8 
million from 239 donor funds (CFTWN, 2019). 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 Most of the grants awarded by the foundation are small; the majority (78%) under 
£5,000, and just 11% worth more than £10,000 (CFTWN, 2019). Yet, despite the emphasis in 
much of the literature on scaling up social impact (Bloom & Chatterji, 2009), the small scale 
does not imply being without impact. Arguably, through smaller, more targeted, precision 
grants, more people, projects, and ultimately communities can benefit, enhancing the 
CFTWN’s capacity to ‘enrich lives through effective giving’ (Maclean, Harvey, & Gordon, 
2013, p. 752). The CFTWN’s success suggests that small wins have the capacity to improve 
the configuration of the general circuitry through which power relations flow (Carter, Clegg, 
& Kornberger, 2010). 
4. Methodology 
The methodology of our study is that of historical organization studies: organizational 
research that draws extensively on historical data, methods and knowledge to generate 
analyses ‘whose validity derives from both historical veracity and conceptual rigor’ to enrich 
‘understanding of historical, contemporary, and future-directed social realities’ (Maclean, 
Harvey, & Clegg, 2016, p. 609). Fundamental to historical organization studies is the 
gathering of primary data from documents and oral testimonies that might cast fresh light on 
the power-laden procedural processes fundamental to change within institutions and 
organizational fields. In-depth historical case studies are valued as a means of developing, 
refining and challenging theory (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; Yin, 2009). Within the 
philanthropic field in the UK, the CFTWN stands out as a ‘significant case’ (Yin, 2009). 
Significant cases facilitate theory building by shedding light on characteristics that are 
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exceptional, thereby helping to ‘unfreeze’ thinking and to extend conceptual understanding 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). We therefore selected our case study 
purposefully (Siggelkow, 2007), as the largest UK community foundation, and an 
acknowledged role model within the field. 
Consistent with other studies of non-profit organizations (Heinze, Soderstron, & 
Heinze, 2016; Moody 2008), we collected multiple forms of qualitative data, including the 
views and reflections of board members past and present, donors and leaders in the nonprofit 
sector. Examining the CFTWN’s documentary record over a 30-year period, including an 
unpublished history written by one of its founders, affords the potential to reconstruct 
strategies, field-wide interactions and capital deployments at the time of its creation and 
institutional embedding. Further depth was lent to the study through the collection of 19 oral 
history testimonies from elite actors involved in the UK community foundation movement. 
Maclean, Harvey and Stringfellow (2017, p. 1231) argue that such testimonies enable 
recovery of ‘the voices of those who are disregarded by macro-accounts as they renegotiate 
memories of identity, place and belonging.’ In total, we collected 19 testimonies, of which 9 
were with people identified primarily with CFTWN and 10 with people knowledgeable about 
the more general diffusion of the community foundation model from the US to the UK. 
Further details are provided in Table 1. 
[Table 1 about here] 
The first stage of data analysis involved transcribing digital recordings of interviews 
and typing up accompanying handwritten field notes. The second stage involved reading and 
rereading transcripts and documents to understand how participants made sense of the 
community foundation model through their ‘meaning-making in vivo and in situ’ (Zilber, 
2007, p. 1051). We coded the data using a computer-based qualitative analysis program, 
NVivo 11, identifying distinct passages of text framing translation in particular ways, for 
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example, ‘allocation of funds’ and ‘forging networks.’ The third stage involved selecting 
revealing extracts from interviews and documents for analysis and discussion at research 
team meetings. In doing so, we created, in the manner recommended by Pentland (1999), a 
contextualized narrative of events, with the goal of moving beyond description to examine 
the role of strategic actors operating within the field of power in translating organizational 
models across space and time. In this explicating mode of historical organization studies, 
history is used in applying and developing theory to reveal the operation of transformative 
social processes (Maclean et al., 2016, pp. 613-614).  
5. Explicating the translation of an innovative philanthropic model 
In this section, we present five major findings from our research. First, we find that 
adoption of the community foundation model in the mid-1980s was spurred by the triumph of 
neo-liberalism. Secondly, we find that strategic elites promoting the model intentionally 
disrupted longstanding philanthropic practices to better address challenges confronting 
communities in the wake of deindustrialization and globalization. Thirdly, we find that 
successful translation required modifying the model to render it fit-for-context. Fourthly, we 
find that successful implementation depended on mobilizing the capitals of diverse elite 
actors within the regional field of power. Finally, we find that only once the model had been 
institutionally embedded could it evolve better to realize its potential. Each of these findings 
is elaborated in the sub-sections that follow. 
5.1 Ideology into action 
In the UK, the community foundation model of philanthropy gained traction in the 
mid-1980s when the government led by Margaret Thatcher rolled back the boundaries of the 
state (Crowson, 2011). Local government budget cuts resulted in the withdrawal of financial 
support to charities. As an alternative to grant funding, frontline charities increasingly 
competed for contracts to provide specified services on behalf of government, lessening the 
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capacity of the voluntary sector to respond to newly identified needs and unpopular causes. In 
this environment, the idea of establishing US-style community foundations in the UK gained 
ground (Interview Former CEO CAF, 2018), establishing the preconditions for the strategic 
translation process that followed.  
The incapacity of the UK government to satisfy growing social welfare needs had 
promoted the ideology of neo-liberalism (Finlayson, 1994; Harvey, 2005), which considered 
the private sector more effective in serving the common interest than the public sector 
(Interview Former Board Member A CFTWN, 2020). Members of the upper and upper-
middle classes had the most to gain from lower taxation and a smaller state, increasing their 
capacity, and potentially willingness, to help fund charitable causes in their own 
communities, strengthening further the historical bond between entrepreneurship and 
philanthropy (Harvey et al., 2019). As the CFTWN’s Former CEO reflected: 
‘It’s not necessarily that they’re extremely philanthropic in a pure sense of the word 
of wanting to support disabled children or whatever. It may be as much to do with the 
fact that it is known that they’re wealthy and they want to show they’re responsible 
citizens’ (Interview Former CEO CFTWN, 2018). 
 
Moreover, far from being antagonistic toward the third sector, Thatcher encouraged 
voluntarism, imagining a future in which local communities flourished through the activities 
of self-governing groups and societies supported by grants from charitable sources (Crowson, 
2011). Michael Brophy, an elite strategic actor connected to all parts of the philanthropic 
field, then CEO of the Charities Aid Foundation (CAF), took his lead from the Prime 
Minister. Brophy had studied community foundations in the US sponsored by the Charles 
Stewart Mott Foundation of Flint, Michigan and decided that the model was transportable to 
the UK (Leat, 2006). CAF and the UK government jointly funded a short-lived Community 
Trust Development Unit to promote the development of community foundations, making 
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modest grants over three years to cover the start-up costs of six would-be foundations. The 
process of transatlantic diffusion had begun in earnest. 
5.2 Disrupting the philanthropic field 
The importance of philanthropy to social welfare in the UK diminished sharply after 
1945, displaced by the welfare state (Owen, 1965). Welfarism cut away the rationale for 
voluntary transfers of funds, and high taxes reduced both the capacity and desire of wealthier 
people to support charitable causes (Finlayson, 1994). However, grant making philanthropic 
foundations supported by endowments and public donations continued to fund charitable 
causes complementary to or outside the purview of the state. In North East England, as 
elsewhere in the UK in the early 1980s, numerous small and medium-sized charitable 
foundations, often under family control, dispensed grants to favoured causes, but increasingly 
were seen as lacking in transparency and strategic direction (Davies, 2015). As recalled in 
one oral history testimony: 
‘The most difficult thing up here was the old boy network. Grant-making worked on 
the basis that if Lord [name withheld] wanted you to do something, you did it. A lot 
of family and charitable trusts worked on that basis. It wasn’t the quality of your 
application; it was if you knew the trustees. If you had worked with a trustee, then 
sure enough the grant would follow’ {Interview Former CEO CFTWN, 2018). 
 
To progressively minded elites, a more systematic and professional approach to philanthropy 
was needed, one that could tap into fresh sources of wealth and distribute funds to maximum 
social benefit (Harvey et al., 2019). 
In North East England, the impetus for change came not from potential 
philanthropists but from the charitable sector. Two third sector networking organizations 
commissioned a report in August 1986 from the Charities Information Service of Tyne & 
Wear on the feasibility of establishing a community foundation in the region (CFTWN, 
2010). The author, Peter Deans, presented his report in March 1987 (CFTWN, 1987). Deans 
was optimistic about the prospects for one or more ‘community trusts’ raising additional 
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funds to support charities within a specific geographic area. In his opinion, ‘developing 
Community Trusts would be rather like investing in an advertising campaign on behalf of our 
local voluntary organizations and then effectively co-ordinating the funds raised from it’ 
(CFTWN, 1987, p. 1). He envisaged raising substantial additional philanthropic funds from 
companies, national grant making trusts, individuals via payroll giving, legacies, and events, 
and from local and central government.  
Deans’ recommendations won approval among progressive elements within the third 
sector, leading to the appointment of a steering group and the solicitation of funds from 
Barings and other grant makers to cover start-up costs. The steering group comprised a mixed 
strategic elite of a former business school Dean cum businessman, Grigor McClelland, 
appointed Chair, three prominent businessmen, all trustees of the Newcastle Diocesan Board 
of Finance, a local authority Director of Social Services, and the Directors of the Councils for 
Voluntary Services for Newcastle and Gateshead (CFTWN, 1988). Its challenge was to 
convince influential others to commit to an unproven philanthropic model that some feared 
might hinder rather than help the third sector by diverting funds that would otherwise flow 
directly to frontline charities. Thus, when the ‘idea was first mooted … it met with 
considerable scepticism’ (CFTWN, 2010, p. 6), encountering resistance in some quarters and 
outright rejection in others, even after CFTWN’s establishment in October 1988. 
This is unsurprising. Disrupting the philanthropic field raised fears among existing 
actors of loss of status and resources. The US community foundation model’s focus on 
building endowment to produce a stable, long-term income for grant making, its interest in 
supporting local voluntary and community activity, and its aim of recruiting a wide range of 
donors were all novel ideas, alien and imperfectly understood. At interview Michael Brophy, 




‘In America, private philanthropy has been much more important as a source of 
funding charities than it has in this country where much more money has come from 
government grants… The level of individual charitable giving is much higher in 
America than it is here because it’s a low-tax economy’ (Interview Former CEO CAF, 
2018). 
 
Indeed, philanthropic dispositions were and continue to be very different in the two countries 
and those involved in the translation of the community foundation model were seen as 
pursuing ideas that ran against the grain of the prevailing logic of practice, which understood 
philanthropy as the preserve of independent foundations supported by wealthy individuals, 
families and companies, not third-sector activists. 
5.3 Translating the community foundation model 
Translation theory proposes that the successful diffusion of organizational models 
depends not on remaining invariant and stable but instead on having ‘interpretive viability’ 
(Benders & Van Veen, 2001, p. 36), ‘leaving room for interpretation in different contexts’ 
(Mueller & Whittle, 2011, p. 188). At the CFTWN, such adaptations related mainly to board 
composition and governance. According to the current CFTWN CEO:  
‘When we were being set up back in the late 1980s, the consultants from the US said 
that boards should be made up of donors. It was felt that this was wrong for this place, 
and that the donor interest had to be balanced with other perspectives, that’s why our 
membership arrangements and board structure were put in place’ (Interview CEO 
CFTWN, 2018). 
 
Rather than creating a US-style donor-led organization, members joined one of four 
constituencies – companies, local authorities, charitable organizations and donors – with 
three board members appointed to represent each constituency (CFTWN, 1988). The 
intention, reflecting the mixed elite composition of the steering group, was to make the 
foundation a stakeholder-based organization with policymaking delegated to stakeholder 
representatives (Interview Former Board Member D CFTWN, 2019). According to one close 
observer, McClelland, as Chair, developed a collegial citizen board, which at the time was 
‘not found elsewhere, at home or abroad’ (Interview Former Project Officer CFTWN, 2019).  
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In consequence, the CFTWN’s culture and practices became suffused with an ethos of 
collaboration and knowledge sharing, in recognition that it needed ‘more than just money, it 
also needed influence in other quarters’ (Interview Former Board Member C CFTWN, 2019). 
The stakeholder model in effect enabled the foundation to extend its reach into all parts of the 
regional field of power, rendering it fit-for-context as well as fit-for-purpose. However, in 
other respects, the CFTWN deliberately set out to learn from US practitioners. In May 1989, 
for example, CEO George Hepburn and Chair Grigor McClelland attended a community 
foundations event in Rugby, England organized by the CAF, but led by a team of US 
consultants hired by the Mott Foundation (CFTWN, 2008). The salience of this event is that 
it marked the beginning of a new stage in the translation process, moving from local 
adaptation to acceptance of some standard US practices. This stage was facilitated by social 
capital mobilization processes, which opened up new vistas for local strategists. At Rugby, 
Hepburn and McClelland met the evangelical Doug Jansson, then CEO of the Rhode Island 
Foundation. Jansson convinced them of (a) the need to focus on raising large sums from 
wealthy individuals and companies, and (b) the need to accumulate a substantial endowment 
in order to achieve independence and permanence (CFTWN, 2009). Following the 
conference, Jansson spent three days in Newcastle spreading the message across the region, 
positioning the CFTWN as a vehicle for ‘the expansion of individual philanthropy’ 
(Interview Former Project Officer CFTWN, 2019). Translating the community foundation 
model from the US to North East England thus created a new network, while inculcating in 
the recipient organization new desires, projects and strategies. 
5.4 Strategic elites and the mobilization of capitals 
 A game-changing development occurred in 1991 when the CAF and the Mott 
Foundation created a £2 million challenge fund, inviting the CFTWN to bid for an 
endowment building grant on condition that for every £1 in grant a further £2 had to be raised 
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locally (Interview Former Board Member C CFTWN, 2019). CFTWN bid for a £1 million 
grant and successfully raised a further £2 million from 40 donors to create an initial 
endowment of £3 million. This accomplishment depended crucially on the social capital of 
the CFTWN board and, more importantly, the social and symbolic power wielded by 
McClelland. As McClelland later recalled: 
‘I learnt that we should target our fundraising at a very small market sector – the top.  
We developed our standing partly by appointing honorary officers – the Lord 
Lieutenant of the county as President, two established local philanthropists, William 
Leech and Catherine Cookson, as Patrons, and a dozen well-known figures connected 
with the region, as Vice-Presidents’ (CFTWN, 2008). 
 
McClelland was a patrician and a Quaker social activist, whose networks spanned the 
fields of academia, business and philanthropy (CFTWN, 2018). He passionately believed that 
‘what is important is that institutions and their administration be constantly tested against 
human values and that those who are concerned about these values be prepared to grapple 
with the complex realities of modern society as it is’ (McClelland, 1976). In the tradition of 
Seebohm Rowntree and other notable members of the Society of Friends, McClelland 
excelled in combining commerce with philanthropy and working for social reform (Maclean, 
Shaw, Harvey, & Booth, 2020). McClelland, by virtue of his moral authority and symbolic 
power, had the authority to convene assemblies within the North East field of power. His 
cultural and symbolic capitals enabled him to persuade others of the justice of the cause, and 
hence the success of the CFTWN in meeting the CAF-Mott endowment challenge. 
Essentially, he brought members of the regional power elite to convert economic capital into 
social and symbolic capital, legitimizing and consolidating their positions within the field of 
power. It is telling that: 
‘At a grand dinner at the Gosforth Park Hotel where Viscount Whitelaw was the 
speaker…  The matching money was found quite quickly… We realised that the 
North East might not be the wealthiest region in the country, but it had a long 




McClelland tapped into the feeling amongst the region’s political and economic elites that 
‘London does not help, we have got to pull our socks up, we have got to look after our own’. 
Paradoxically, ‘the distance from London, the distance from the capital’, enabled ‘a stronger, 
more independent feel’ (Interview Former CEO CFTWN, 2018). 
What appealed most was the idea of creating a fresh coalition within the field of 
power of elites dedicated to socioeconomic renewal within the region. A US community 
foundation practitioner, conducting an evaluation of the CFTWN for the CAF-Mott challenge 
grant programme, found its board to be ‘peopled with individuals of stature in the area’ 
(CFTWN, 2010). Their involvement was the trump card during the organization’s early stage 
of development, strategically raising its profile and endorsing its capabilities: 
‘People would support the foundation because lots of people famous in the region 
were already involved. They could see it was well run, that it was an effective means 
of handling philanthropy’ (Interview CEO CFTWN, 2018). 
 
McClelland’s industry breathed life into what at the time was a novel philanthropic practice. 
He applied extensive reserves of social and symbolic capital to kick-start the CFTWN and 
stimulate an upward spiral of fundraising. As the one informant put it: ‘Grigor put his name 
and reputation behind an untried, untested project and made it great’ (Interview Former 
Board Member B CFTWN, 2020). Without his personal distinction, it would have been 
difficult for the CFTWN to gain access to elite networks or convince potential donors to 
support projects and initiatives designed to overcome socioeconomic inequalities. 
McClelland displayed ‘strategic habitus’ – a feel for the game in terms of bringing people 
together and making it work. He facilitated bonding across networks with individuals who 
shared common values, bringing together elites from the business world, third sector, and 
local authorities, ‘deliberately bringing together donors, beneficiaries, and supporters’ 
(Interview CEO CFTWN, 2018). In this, the founders, who had considerable experience of 
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regeneration coalitions composed of elites from different fields, followed the logic of 
partnership rather than the more elementary logic expressed in the saying ‘he who pays the 
piper calls the tune.’ Their promotion of the community foundation model as a source of 
social renewal, when traditional industries were in their death throes, resonated with regional 
strategic elites, insinuating the CFTWN as a player within the local field of power. 
5.5 Embedding the community foundation model 
The CFTWN continued to adapt and evolve following its acceptance within the North 
East philanthropic field. The organization worked hard at raising its endowment, which had 
reached £12 million by 1996. It was at this point that the CFTWN’s former CEO experienced 
his ‘second road to Damascus’ following the visit to Newcastle of ‘another US consultant 
from San Francisco’ (CFTWN, 2009, p. 6). Robert Fisher drilled home the necessity for CFs 
to take a fully professional approach to donor services. What Fisher advised was that the 
foundation should focus on developing the capabilities needed to add value to the 
philanthropists’ experience of philanthropy. In other words, the organization must understand 
the world from the perspective of wealthy donors, especially what motivates them and the 
satisfactions and rewards they derive from philanthropy. The lesson, as later related, was that: 
‘A community foundation has to meet its donors’ “psychic rewards” … these are not 
necessarily related to the beneficiary of the gift. A donor might, for example, be 
seeking acceptance into an elite social circle, or even, in the UK, be pursuing a 
Knighthood… Managing the donor fund became paramount… causing more work, 
but it was a way of soliciting subsequent donations…  It was not for us to rank 
different forms of philanthropic motivation as much as to understand it in each 
individual case… We re-tooled the foundation as a donor services agency’ (Interview 
Former CEO CFTWN, 2018). 
 
The idea, stated simply, was that when advising businesses or wealthy individuals and 
families, community foundation fund advisors should display the same professionalism as 
lawyers and accountants, serving as a guide to donors as they travel on their philanthropic 
journeys (Maclean, Harvey, Gordon, & Shaw, 2015). As one major donor recalled: 
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‘We had started giving but weren’t being strategic about it and didn’t really know 
what to do or how to think about it. Then, through a mutual friend we met [CEO] 
and from that developed a conversation that opened our eyes and really helped us, 
and of course his own organization’ (Interview Major Donor CFTWN, 2019). 
 
The elevation of donor services effectively recognized that while the CFTWN aspires to 
be a democratic, inclusive organization, with members drawn from multiple constituencies 
and a stakeholder representative board, the balance of power in philanthropic relationships 
ultimately resides with donors, not beneficiaries (Harvey, Gordon, & Maclean, 2020). It is 
for this reason that the CFTWN by custom appoints its Chair from the ranks of major 
donors. Inclusivity thus confers legitimacy without compromising the natural order of 
power relations implicit in the community foundation model of philanthropy. 
6. Discussion and conclusion 
To the fore in this article is consideration of how the theoretical ideas of Pierre 
Bourdieu might be deployed more widely in strategy research. We argue that, with notable 
exceptions (e.g. Oakes et al., 1998; Pratap & Saha, 2018; Tsoukas, 1996), few scholars have 
embraced the full implications of Bourdieusian theory as a radically different way of thinking 
about strategy. In contrast to the mainstream, Bourdieu puts power, in all its guises, centre 
stage. In his world, strategic actors are interdependent, and habitus, history and practices all 
matter. Not only is strategy about organizations, whether dominant or subordinate, battling 
for status and resources, it is also about how strategic actors and practices fashion society. 
The purpose of our historical case study is both to demonstrate the value Bourdieu’s ideas, 
and to enable fresh theorization about how new organizational models successfully diffuse. 
We reflect in what follows first on our contribution to translation theory, and then on the 
potential of the field of power construct to enrich strategy research. 
6.1 Cross-national translation of organizational models 
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The idea that ideas and models are translated – changed, modified and adapted – 
through interactions between actors as they pass through time and space is anchored in 
actor-network theory (Czarniawska & Sevón, 2005; Latour, 2005). It has been recognized, 
however, that translation theory, as presently constituted, is limited by its failure to 
identify the operation of causal mechanisms within what Fligstein and McAdam (2012) 
call strategic action fields (Elder-Vass, 2008; Sayes, 2017). In other words, translation 
theory tells us little about the motivations and modus operandi of the strategic actors 
involved in the process of translation (Whittle & Mueller, 2010). Here, we propose that 
organizational models are diffused, adapted and (re)embedded within local contexts 
through mobilization of resources and support within the field of power. This extension to 
translation theory explains how strategic actors of different hues form coalitions to gain 
the authority needed to enact translations and accommodate the interests of elites who 
otherwise might stand in opposition. 
The CFTWN depended at its inception more on the application of symbolic power to 
bring about institutional change than on ready availability of economic capital, as, intuitively, 
might be supposed in a philanthropic context. Translation in practice represented far more 
than an economic or transactional exercise. Its accomplishment crucially depended on the 
power of those who had ‘obtained sufficient recognition to be in a position to impose 
recognition’ (Bourdieu, 1989, p. 23). Thus, the translation process repositioned and 
restructured historical and institutional forces within the philanthropic field. To gain 
acceptance, strategic actors had to depart from the standard US practice of donor-led 
governance, instead devising a stakeholder model in which subscribers and board members 
represent different interests within the field of power. 
Establishing the CFTWN depended on mobilizing the capitals of numerous elite 
actors; the wealthy who invested economic capital, and others who variously invested 
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cultural, social, and symbolic capital. The first Chair played a pivotal role. As a bridging 
actor connected to different fractions within the field of power, he forged the alliance that 
created and institutionally embedded the CFTWN. Symbolic power worked to accommodate 
interests that were themselves ‘the product of domination’ (Bourdieu, 2001, p. 5), such that 
the ‘order of things’ came to seem natural, self-evident, and legitimate, paving the way for 
later changes. Most importantly, once the foundation had begun to motor, the voice of the 
region’s economic elite grew louder, leading to the foundation’s emergence as a donor 
services agency. In restoring normal order – the hegemony of the economic elite – possession 
of economic capital ultimately outweighed the equalizing effects of stakeholder governance, 
which, by maintaining the illusion of equality, facilitated the conversion of economic to 
symbolic capital; ‘with all the forms of legitimating redistribution … financing “disinterested 
foundations”, donations to hospitals, academic and cultural institutions, etc. … through which 
dominant groups secure a capital of “credit” which seems to owe nothing to the logic of 
exploitation’ (Bourdieu, 1990, p. 133). 
6.2 Potential value of the field of power construct to strategy research 
The field of power is a meso-level construct whose value resides in analysing how 
strategic elites working in concert accomplish profound changes in societal arrangements 
within the bounds of existing social structures and relations (Maclean & Harvey, 2019). 
Strategic elites in effect are institutional workers whose activities extend beyond the confines 
of organizational boundaries (Lawrence, Suddaby, & Leca, 2011). They are people who have 
ascended to the top of fields before acceding to the field of power where they regularly 
interact with actors of similar status in formal and informal settings. They are recognized 
playmakers with enough social and symbolic capital to lead coalitions of powerful actors in 
pursuit of game-changing objectives like legal and regulatory changes that benefit themselves 
and those they serve (Maclean, Harvey & Kling, 2014). Elite strategic actors active are drawn 
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from all quarters, including business, government, finance, politics, the charitable sector, 
public administration, medicine, academia, organized religion, military, media, and the law 
(Maclean, Harvey & Kling, 2017). Some fields are more heavily represented than others. 
Coalitions may span one or more fields. The possibilities are legion, and at times alliances are 
hard to discern because some actors remain in the shadows, content to let others take the lead 
(Maclean & Harvey, 2016). 
Our illustrative case study focused on strategic elites operating within the North East 
England field of power. Fields of power exist in nested configurations at the international, 
national, regional and local levels, each corresponding to specific institutional arrangements 
rooted in specific histories and cultures (Maclean, Harvey & Kling, 2017). In our case, the 
coalition that came together to embed an initially alien organizational model within the 
philanthropic field was comprised of strategic elites from business, the voluntary sector and 
local administration. These actors had the strategic intent of tapping new wealth to provide 
funding for cash-strapped charities in the name of social renewal. 
Numerous other opportunities exist to deploy the field of power construct. In research 
on corporate governance, for example, it has been used to examine how change is enacted by 
actors responsive to failings but unwilling to compromise the prevailing logic of practice 
(Harvey, Maclean & Price, 2020; Price, Harvey, Maclean & Campbell, 2018). We propose 
that institutional work of this kind, defined by Lawrence, Suddaby, and Leca (2011, p. 52) as 
‘the practices of individual and collective actors aimed at creating, maintaining, and 
disrupting institutions’ is conducted by elite actors within the field of power. New avenues 
for research, might be opened up, therefore, by elaborating more precisely the settings in 
which institutional work is performed and who is involved. The same applies to the field of 
non-market strategy, conceived by Baron (1995, p. 47) as ‘a concerted pattern of actions 
taken in the nonmarket environment to create value by improving [a firm’s] overall 
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performance.’ In this case, as Doh et al. (2011, p. 37) recognize, ‘the challenge ahead is for 
researchers’, in interrogating behaviours like coalition building and lobbying, to extend 
‘understanding of firms and managers as intermediaries to shape and be shaped by 
institutional environments.’ Bourdieu’s construct of the field of power, we propose, might 
help in meeting this challenge, enriching this branch of strategy research. 
6.3 Limitations and future research 
The strengths and corresponding limitations of our research stem from our research 
design. In focusing on a single case, we sacrificed breadth for depth, limiting the 
generalizability of findings on the translation of the community foundation model of 
philanthropy. We did so to take advantage of the opportunity to infuse history with theory, 
putting Bourdieu’s ideas to work in illustrating the constitution and modus operandi of the 
field of power in a particular setting. In taking this approach, we were able to gain access to 
documents and oral history testimonies that enabled the reconstruction of events at a critical 
time in the disruption and reformulation of the philanthropic field. In future research, we 
intend to observe and chronicle in real time strategic elites at work within the field of power. 
6.4 Conclusion 
What Bourdieu brings to the study of strategy is a deep understanding of the dynamics of 
power in organizations, fields and society, and a conceptual arsenal that enables power 
effects to be identified and subject to the critical gaze. Each of his main constructs is of 
proven analytical value in its own right, spawning many studies based on single concepts like 
social capital and symbolic power. The argument we make here is that together is better. 
When Bourdieu’s concepts are applied in tandem rather than in isolation, the full implications 
of his conception of strategy emerge. The as yet largely unrealized potential of the field of 
power construct is large, but, we hold, it cannot be tapped if decoupled from Bourdieu’s more 
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Former Chair WINGS 1999-2008 2019 
Former Program Officer Mott Foundation 1998-2005 2019 
Former CEO CF A  2002-2018 2018 
Former CEO CF B  2016-2019 2018 
CEO CF C  2018- 2018 
CEO CF D  2015- 2019 
CEO CF E  2014- 2019 
CEO CF F  2004- 2019 
Case study – 9 interviews 
Former Project Officer CFTWN 1987-1988 2019 
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CEO CFTWN 2009- 2018 
Former Board Member A CFTWN 1988-1995 2020 
Former Board Member B CFTWN 1995-2001 2020 
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